Values, Norms, and Actions (Translation)
Páramo Valero, Víctor. Weber and Kondylis: On the Social Sciences. La torre del Virrey: Revista de Estudios Culturales, no. 16, 2014/2, translated by Haniel.
This comparative essay is a nice piece of supplementary material for those brave few who dare to wade through the dense jungle of our beloved Panagiotis Kondylis’s work Power and Decision. Here, Kondylis lays bare his philosophy in terms that would make any sensitive young man weep with joy—or at least with the existential dread that’s practically synonymous with intellectual rigor these days.
This translation is meant for that select group who, after the tragic exile of N. Carlsbad, kept the flickering flame of descriptive decisionism alive. A truly commendable band, diverse in their interests and disciplines, yet united by that peculiar lifestyle choice that tenure professors and administrators cling to in order to justify the accelerated social, sexual, and economic decline of ntt faculty members: “The Life of the Mind.”
Now, considering the motley crew we’re talking about—an expression, no doubt, of the mass democratic spirit of our times (because, really, where else would our intellectual salons be if not on Twitter?)—it’s only natural that some among them might be blissfully ignorant of the heavyweights who prefigured Kondylis’s brand of rigorous thought. Expecting a chemist, a pol-sci student, or, heaven forbid, a “computer scientist” to know the intricate history of social sciences and humanities in the West is like asking a hedge fund manager to churn out a sonnet—both utterly ridiculous and as futile as expecting decency from a corporate parasite.
And that’s precisely why this article has its use. Valero does the heavy lifting, putting Kondylis in context by squaring him off against the likes of Max Weber, Schmitt, and even indirectly with someone like Richard Rorty. He even drags Kondylis into a pointless brawl with the Kantian-rooted normativism of Jürgen Habermas—because apparently, subjecting Kondylis’s work to the deadening drone of Habermas’s insipid ramblings was a necessary evil.
But, of course, Valero, in his infinite wisdom, might be guilty of oversimplification, drawing too neat a line between Kondylis’s decisionism and that of Carl Schmitt. He seems to have overlooked Kondylis’s devastating critique of Schmitt’s decisionist anti-positivism, which places Kondylis closer to Kelsen in the grand scheme of things—a detail that probably slipped under Valero’s radar while he was busy trying to force Kondylis into a Schmitt-shaped box.
Likewise, Valero conveniently glosses over the intellectual behemoth who most directly shaped Kondylis’s methodology: Reinhart Koselleck. Kondylis’s methodological aporias, which he so meticulously points out in his own work, were already simmering in Koselleck’s cauldron.
That said, a few formal tweaks were made to the original text: 1) I couldn’t be bothered to transcribe all the footnotes—if you’re that desperate, go look them up yourself (pp. 83-84). 2) I decided to italicize all rhetorical questions because, well, aesthetics matter. 3) If you see any bold italics, that’s straight from the author, just so you don’t mix them up with my own stylistic flourishes.
Introduction
The objective of this article is to analyze the conception of norms and values developed by Panagiotis Kondylis (1943-1998), a German philosopher of Greek origin, and Max Weber (1864-1920), a thinker who made significant contributions across various scientific fields (sociology, history, philosophy) and is remembered for works such as The Politician and the Scientist, Economy and Society, and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In the thought of both authors, this issue is closely linked to what can be termed a "philosophy of the social sciences." Weber and Kondylis engaged in numerous philosophical debates, through which they forged their own positions.
Kondylis developed a descriptive version of decisionism in a polemic with Carl Schmitt. Weber, on the other hand, engaged in various sociological and philosophical debates. One of Weber's lesser-known criticisms—sometimes considered marginal and irrelevant1—can be found in an essay where he meticulously examines the conception of social norms as posited by the sociologist Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938). In this context, Weber occasionally uses the terms "maxim" and "rule," not in a moral sense, but as synonyms for "norm."2
Throughout his intellectual career, Weber was influenced by various schools of thought, and his work is distinguished by the scientific clarity of exposition and the reflective depth of a philosopher. In his Critique of Stammler, the influence of Neo-Kantian schools is evident from the first page to the last. Additionally, the literary style of the German thinker stands out, characterized by the aforementioned clarity and meticulousness in analysis, creating the impression that no topic, question, or problem related to Stammler's work has been overlooked. In this critique, and in other writings that resonate with the reflections contained within it, Weber presents an original conception of the knowledge inherent to the social sciences (disciplines such as sociology, economics, and law).
This type of knowledge possesses specific characteristics that distinguish it from the knowledge produced by other sciences. The term "social sciences" currently refers to those sciences that use empirical methods to confirm hypotheses related to human beings or some of their expressions, rather than objects like those in mathematics or physics, nor those belonging to fields such as philology or history.
Unlike the humanities, the social sciences use procedures to obtain scientific knowledge that are also employed in research typical of the abstract and natural sciences. The humanities do not use this type of methodology and seemingly should refrain from doing so. But what about the social sciences? Should they move closer to the humanities, or should they continue drawing from the methodological sources of the natural sciences? What have Kondylis and Weber thought on this matter? What role does the conception of values and norms play in this reflection on the social sciences? If there is a connection between these two spheres, is it superfluous or essential?
In what follows, we will attempt to answer these and other questions. To do so, we will first examine Weber's conception of moral values and social norms, focusing exclusively on one of the dimensions this issue takes in his work. Secondly, we will do the same with Kondylis's conception, addressing some of the major themes in his philosophy (decisionism, criticism of normativism, moral skepticism, critique of social and political utopias, among others) that are closely linked to the question of values and moral norms. In the third and final section, we will provide a brief comparison of the positions held by each author as a conclusion.
The Rationality of Norms and Moral Values According to Weber
There are two reasons why we first consider Weber's thought: 1) he is a classical author in the field of social science theory and theory of values; 2) Kondylis was familiar with Weber’s work and developed an original conception of norms and values that engages with the debate Weber was immersed in, as well as other philosophical and scientific debates that are somewhat obscure today. These debates were undoubtedly significant, but today the positions they represent have been surpassed (or simply abandoned) for those of other authors. Currently, figures such as S. Zizek, P. Sloterdijk, J. Habermas, and A. Honneth, as well as from a different perspective, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Rorty, Fukuyama, Vattimo, and Lipovetsky dominate the European and American moral and political philosophical landscape. Other important voices in the debate on moral values have been Ch. Taylor and A. MacIntyre. Nevertheless, Weber’s position remains a valid reference, despite the fact that, like others, it can only be genuinely understood within the tradition of thought from which it originates and develops.
In his article "Social Science and Values in Max Weber," J. Rovira contextualizes the issue of values within Weber's philosophy of social sciences and clarifies the three main dimensions that values take in the work of the German thinker:
The theoretically supported study of empirical and historical values as guide for social behavior and the analysis of the implications this has for the genesis and functioning of social institutions.
The problem related to the personal (subjective) process of selecting research objects undertaken by every scientist, a process that Max Weber referred to as the relationship with values, following Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) from the Kantian renewal movement of the Baden philosophical school, though Weber would eventually transcend this perspective.
The recognition that there are two heterogeneous spheres that must be clearly distinguished to avoid their confusing amalgamation and the detrimental consequences this would have for scientific and academic work. The first is the sphere of social facts, empirical and historical processes, and their scientific analysis, which leads us to make descriptive or explanatory statements about social reality, involving the attempt to verify or disprove such statements. The second is the sphere of value judgments or evaluations, through which desires, preferences, tastes, aspirational ideals, or perceived duties in relation to the actual state of affairs are expressed. In this latter type of judgment within this second sphere, we encounter the normative field.3
Following Rovira's established division, the problem regarding values in Weber's work that most concerns us is the relationship between objective descriptions and value judgments. This issue is incomprehensible in Weber's work without proposing a clear distinction between the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of value judgments. These judgments are subjective in that they are based on values whose content is also subjective. Since there is no rational way to decide in favor of one value over another—since it depends on individual desires and cannot be preceded by a rational demonstration, though it can involve reasoning about which objectives can be achieved by choosing that value and which cannot—the value judgments made from a particular moral perspective (i.e., based on values) cannot aspire to the objectivity of scientific descriptions, which apparently have no relation to values.
2.1. Scientific Knowledge and the Nature of Values
Although the central themes of Weber's work are deeply interconnected with his political concerns4 (in the field of political theory, he is widely known for essays such as "Politics as a Vocation"), his sociology extends beyond the realm of politics. His contributions to the sociology of economics and religion are also significant, and even his historical contributions have been deemed relevant. In The Assault on Reason, Lukács attributed an important role to Weber in the development of "irrationalism" in German social thought. Weber's examination of the concept of scientific and political rationality, as well as its connection with the inherent irrationality of values (due to their subjective nature)5, reveals problems within his sociology that carry philosophical and cultural implications.
In the collection of texts published under the title On the Theory of Social Sciences, Weber includes a contribution addressing the problem of "The Objectivity of Knowledge in the Social Sciences and Politics."6 In this piece, the German thinker notes that no social theory is free from the influence of "political tendencies," prevailing economic ideas in society, or certain ideologies. Thus, scientific theories about society are imbued with "principles" of a political, moral, economic, etc., nature. No scientific theory is axiomatically neutral; it is always connected to values, which function not as secondary elements to be ignored or eliminated but as necessary assumptions upon which it relies and from which it originates.7
Weber addresses the issue of the "principles"—moral, political, ideological, and so forth—that act upon or influence every social theory.8 The "declaration of principles" required of every scientist is not incompatible with the possibility of presenting "evidence" and "facts." In other words, it is acknowledged that theorizing must always be done from a particular standpoint, but this should not lead us to conclude that it is impossible to discuss facts within the realm of sociology. Of course, facts are in themselves the result of interpretations9, but some interpretations align more closely with the facts than others.
Weber's examination of the nature of scientific knowledge is closely linked to the issue of the subjectivity of moral values and evaluations. Values are subjective choices and, therefore, irrational. The selection of values is also made irrationally, as there are no objective criteria to determine one value over another. With this idea, Weber highlights what was already present in the nihilist (now termed "postmodern"10) philosophy of his time: no value holds absolute validity, and especially, supreme values, which are summed up in the idea of God, have lost this validity. The belief in God has ceased to be valid: "God is dead."11 Values, in addition to lacking absolute validity—being relative, conditioned by the tradition from which they emerge, and contingent—have a subjective constitution. At the same time, moral values, which can be derived from religious values, are not amenable to rational or scientific study. Scientific rationality is incompatible with the investigation of values.
Thus, values (and valuations) have three fundamental characteristics:
They are relative: There are no absolute values.
They are subjective: There are no objective values.
As a consequence, there can be no scientific knowledge of values: Axiology, as the science of values, is a pseudoscience.
Weber explores the subjective nature of values in Science as a Vocation. He examines the contrast between scientific knowledge and values—which reflects the ideas of subjectivity and the impossibility of scientific knowledge of values—across various works, especially those related to the methodology and philosophy of social sciences. In his Critique of Stammler, Weber argues that values and moral norms have a fundamentally different nature from epistemic categories. Similarly, in "The Objectivity of Knowledge in the Social Sciences and Politics," Weber addresses the distinction between scientific knowledge and moral values, focusing specifically on the nature of knowledge in the social sciences.
Weber differentiates between "value judgment" and "theoretical propositions," a distinction central to his understanding of scientific knowledge. This distinction also helps clarify the difference between idealizations in the social sciences and those in the natural sciences. In the natural sciences, idealizations are universal laws—statements within a theory that explain phenomena with universal validity. But how are these laws developed? How do scientists create universally valid statements such as scientific laws? Weber clarifies that theoretical assumptions differ from value judgments. In the social sciences, value judgments play a crucial role as the starting point or foundational support for a theory.
This starting point distinguishes social sciences from natural sciences because, in the latter, knowledge pertains to facts—meaning it is objective, and theoretical assumptions do not introduce any subjective elements into the knowledge derived from them. In this sense, idealizations in the human sciences, whether social or cultural, differ significantly from those in natural sciences. While the former are based on elements that are neither neutral nor objective, the latter ensure from the outset that the knowledge obtained is objective, as theoretical assumptions, unlike value judgments, do not have a "private" character. However, Weber acknowledges that the scientific explanation of human behavior—which he sees as the goal of social sciences—can have the same validity as natural scientific explanations. The point is not that scientists should completely set aside their political, moral, or social opinions (which is impossible), but rather that they should use these opinions in line with the objectives of science: to generate new knowledge.
Weber addresses the issue of value judgments and the freedom of evaluation in the social sciences in his essay titled "The Sense of Freedom of Evaluation in Sociological and Economic Sciences." At the outset of the essay, he asserts: “By ‘valuations,’ we mean the ‘practical’ appraisals of a phenomenon, which can influence our actions by approving or disapproving of it.” Runciman refers to the problem Weber explores in this essay when discussing Weber's views on values in his critique. He notes the following:
"Weber insisted on the logical independence of factual judgments and value judgments, and on the consequent irrelevance of the social scientist’s aesthetic, political, or moral opinions to the validity of their proposals about human behavior."
The division between sciences where values play a significant role and those where values should have no function corresponds to the distinction between the human sciences and the natural sciences. In the human sciences, value judgments contribute to knowledge. The cognitive value of such judgments lies precisely in the fact that they are derived from fieldwork (for instance, a cultural anthropologist may present value judgments about a tribe with which they have lived for years).
As we have noted, this is a significant issue within Weber's social thought. Weber approaches the problem from various perspectives, thereby highlighting its different facets. Among these perspectives are the ones we have examined.
2.2. Axiological Polytheism
Weber coined the renowned term “axiological polytheism” (or polytheism of values). This term confirmed a prevailing trend in positivist philosophical-scientific thought, which asserts that the model or paradigm of knowledge is established by the formal and empirical sciences, ranging from logic and mathematics to applied physics and cellular biology. According to this view, the social sciences were expected to adhere to this same model.
Weber's thesis on axiological polytheism and the objectivity of natural and social sciences presents several methodological, practical, and theoretical challenges. It is not always possible to exclude what is considered "pseudoscientific" within the realm of "absolutely objective" sciences. For example, as Kuhn demonstrated after Weber, science does not only develop through its connection with social institutions, which set the goals for scientific research, but also because scientists operate according to parameters that govern the social world.
Scientific research and the production of new theoretical and practical knowledge are commonly conducted by groups or communities of scientists, whose behavior cannot be entirely different from their behavior outside the scientific realm. The communal nature of producing scientific knowledge is not so dissimilar, for instance, from the celebration of a liturgical act in any of the monotheistic religions, where God is glorified. Consequently, knowledge, if it is objective, is not so in the sense that values do not interfere in its acquisition, but rather in the sense that they do not negatively affect it. Even in the most abstract scientific knowledge, it is not obtained in a completely neutral manner; elements such as economic profitability or market opportunities play a role.
In Politics as a Vocation, Weber uses the term "axiological polytheism" to describe a notable feature of European societies in the past century: moral and religious values are inherently subjective. They cannot be scientifically verified. It cannot be proven that some values are better than others or that we should prefer some over others. The value of the good in religion X is equivalent to the value of the good in religion Y. Thus, within the realm of values, individuals can subjectively or personally decide which are most appropriate. Each person can worship their own gods (values). This is the essence of Weber's expression.
There are multiple values, much like the many gods in Homer's religion: so many that we cannot identify which are the true ones, because in essence, all are true. All hold the same moral status: all are gods. Moreover, there are no scientific reasons that could convince us that the value of the good in Calvinist morality is more accurate than the value of the good in Islam. Both conceptions of the good are comparable. Thus, the realm of values lacks rationality (in the scientific sense). Values are ultimately chosen based on convictions and faith, not reasons. If in the realm of morality there are no reasons to choose one conception of the good over another, or to choose values like tolerance, respect, or justice, then it seems unlikely that mutual agreement among different worldviews and religions will occur.
If morality is something subjective and private, it cannot serve as the foundation for common life. Consequently, it must be politics—the political realm, specifically a liberal politics (or political liberalism)—that establishes boundaries between what pertains to the public sphere and what belongs to the private realm.
Due to this, it is essential to have social and legal norms, rules, or laws that anchor the relationships between individuals within a society. Near the end of The Politician and the Scientist, Weber notes:
"The fate of this time, rationalized, intellectualized, and above all, detached from the myth of the world, is precisely that the ultimate and most exalted values are absent from public life, retreating either to the transcendent realm of mystical life or to the fraternity of immediate human relationships."
Weber not only identifies the triumph of the idea of the irrationality of values over the rationality of scientific knowledge in ethics but also finds it in the realm of art. This signifies the loss of absolute validity of values across all aspects of human existence. The ineffability of values extends to artistic endeavors as well. Art, like morality, is the domain where pure subjectivity thrives. Both morality and art have been cast out of the paradise of objectivity, which is solely occupied by knowledge obtained through empirical methods—knowledge based on demonstration and verification. Genuine knowledge is accessible through experience to all subjects, while in the case of art and moral values, the situation is the opposite: being subjective, private, and personal, there is no possible way to reconcile different subjectivities.
The most pressing issue in the "ongoing battle between the gods of different systems and values" is the question of truth. Are some values closer to the truth than others? Is truth itself a value, though not a moral one but an epistemic one? Could the pluralism of values also impact the epistemological realm, and consequently, relativize truth—i.e., relativize what has traditionally been considered true and false, blurring the boundaries between truth and falsity? The divide between the truth of science—and science itself—and the truth of values represents an abyss, as illustrated by Weber’s expression.
As E. Martínez Navarro notes, Weber discovered and demonstrated that…
"… the evolution of the West has followed a dual process: a progression in rationalization, signifying the triumph of technical rationality, and a progression in disenchantment, marking the loss of worldviews that proposed ultimate ends. This, in turn, leads to the emergence of axiological pluralism—the conviction that moral values are a matter of faith belonging to the private realm."
2.3. Social Rules and the Structure of Society
As Rodríguez Martínez highlights in his introduction to the Critique of Stammler, Weber's work, "formulated within the context of the debate among German Neo-Kantian schools, introduces concepts like life and social rules that are pivotal for the thorough grounding of his sociological and economic theories." These ideas are not only essential for grasping Weber's own thought but also for those who build upon the foundation he established in sociological research.
In Weber's view, social rules always act upon the "phenomena" of social life. Unlike logical rules applied to propositions, Weber does not equate social rules with the pure concepts of Understanding or the pure intuitions of Sensibility. If social rules were analogous to these pure concepts, social life would be entirely conditioned by them, with their influence being irreversible and immutable. Pure concepts, once given, cannot be altered, and knowledge of these concepts is inherently shaped by them, assuming they exist and are genuinely known. However, social rules do not hold the same significance for social life as pure concepts do for human knowledge.
According to Weber, social rules can have a private nature and are not necessarily public, meaning they do not affect everyone. Instead of being "logically constitutive" of society, social rules are established within society and possess a historical and cultural character. There are as many social rules as there are societies. These rules are produced within the context of specific societies and, therefore, cannot be regarded as concepts of Understanding. Rather, they are "empirical generalizations" whose validity is not universal but contingent. The legitimacy of a rule, according to Weber, is not found in any "transcendental" nature but in its origins as a product of concrete social praxis.
If "social forms" are considered as immutable and imperishable maxims or rules of action, social events could indeed be understood not as products of chance but as products of necessity. If these rules were constitutive of society—meaning they were unchangeable—it would be impossible to enact societal changes through concrete actions. This issue has been the subject of extensive research today. From economics to politics, there is debate on whether social actions can truly impact the system. This question also extends to the fields of law and history. To what extent are the actions of individuals in a society predetermined or pre-conceived by the social system itself? Can the actions individuals take to attempt to alter the existing social system be anticipated? It seems that the social system, in itself, cannot be entirely eliminated. There will always be a social system providing the backdrop for social actions.
And within that system are the social rules. Contrary to some sociologists of his time, Weber believed that social actions could indeed have effects against the system and that the structure of such a system could be changed. Anthony Giddens, a contemporary sociologist, has followed Weber's approach in his work The Constitution of Society.
2.4. On Value Judgements
Weber's theory of value-neutral research is deeply rooted in the positivist conception of scientific knowledge. In value neutrality, subjective evaluations and ideas based on empirically untestable notions are set aside. This means that personal experiences, feelings, and beliefs—often shaped by dogmas—are excluded. Such experiences, which from a scientific perspective are "ineffable" and cannot be articulated or codified in a shared language (whether scientific or not), lack an epistemic foundation. They fall into the realm of fantasy, imagination, and pure chimeras—often even hallucinations—that cannot be accounted for or justified by shared experience. From the standpoint of logical positivism, these are expressed as metaphysical and ethical statements that transcend experience, essentially everything that is inaccessible to multiple subjects simultaneously and incompatible with what is considered "objective knowledge."
Value judgments, which are those whose content cannot be empirically tested, are considered closer to "subjective interpretation" in this context. The term "interpretation" here carries a pejorative connotation, standing in opposition to "explanation." In this sense, interpretation relies on experience to confirm the thesis or result reached through explanation, unlike interpretation itself. Weber believes that this meaning of "interpretation" is very close to that of "valuation." Value judgments or valuations are merely subjective statements; they convey content that cannot be subjected to empirical scrutiny. In this context, to "verify" means to legitimize and justify.
According to Weber, legitimate rational research is one where the knowledge obtained is justified, proven, confirmed, and verified. For Popper, the criterion of demarcation—the criterion for testing a scientific theory, which confirms whether a theory is true or false—is falsification. A scientific theory is corroborated as long as no counterexamples are found to falsify it. A scientific theory is falsified once a counterexample is discovered. Weber holds that genuine scientific knowledge is that which is not directed or influenced, at any stage of its production, by value judgments.
Scientific knowledge is, by definition, axiomatically neutral; otherwise, it would not qualify as scientific knowledge. Science (both natural and social sciences) stands in opposition to value judgments. Explanation must be central to scientific knowledge, while interpretation and valuation must be excluded. Weber acknowledges that value judgments can possess a form of rationality, but he considers this rationality to be "subjective." In contrast, there is objective rationality, which pertains to scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge possesses objective rationality because it produces knowledge that can be empirically tested.
However, Weber does not believe that science should be entirely free from value judgments. While value judgments must be present in scientific research, only certain kinds are appropriate, as we have seen. Therefore, it is essential to discern which types of value judgments can be part of such research. Subjective rationality, which must be clearly distinguished from objective rationality, can coexist with the latter without diminishing or impoverishing it.
Two scholars of Weber's thought, Rovira and Runciman, agree that Weber acknowledges the possibility of values influencing social sciences, but he maintains that they are fundamentally non-axiological. That is, while there is always a possibility that the values of a researcher may implicitly or explicitly guide or significantly influence their investigation, this does not mean that social sciences cannot or do not strive to be axiomatically neutral. Runciman states, "Weber agrees with the positivists that social sciences are non-axiological and causal." Rovira adds,
"For Weber, the irreducibly subjective nature of engaging with values, which precedes the more strictly scientific process of inquiry, in no way undermines the objectivity that social science aspires to, nor does it affect the attainment of intersubjective truths or, if preferred, the achievement of statements about reality whose truth or falsity can be convincingly and satisfactorily established."
We have highlighted "the objectivity that social science aspires to" to emphasize that achieving this objectivity is the primary goal Weber assigns to social science. The interpretation of both authors can be supported by passages such as the following:
"The ability to differentiate between knowing and judging, and the fulfillment of both the scientific duty to perceive the truth of facts and the practical duty to adhere to one's own ideals—this is what we wish to become increasingly familiar with."
2.5. Rationality of Norms
In "The Problem of Irrationality in the Social Sciences," Weber questions whether it is possible to deduce practical norms with absolute value from abstract conceptual premises. These premises, like the norms themselves, have a moral character, even though norms are designed to govern action and therefore have a theoretical-practical nature, whereas the abstract conceptual premises from which the norms are derived are purely theoretical. The connection between the two lies in their moral character.
In the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals," Kant had already distinguished between morality with a rational foundation, where norms are derived from this foundational requirement, and the formal content of the imperative, which, despite its abstract nature (due to its claim to universal validity), has an intrinsic connection to practice, as it is designed to govern human actions. Do absolute norms exist, meaning norms with universal validity due to their unconditional nature, which is provided by the rational foundation they rest upon? In the realm Weber examines, such norms do not exist. Rationality in science is not the same as moral rationality; in other words, only scientific knowledge is truly rational. While norms governing action can indeed have a rational foundation, this rationality is not at all akin to the rationality envisioned by Kantian ethics, which holds that the categorical imperative has universal validity due to its inherent form.
The categorical imperative aims to be valid beyond the context in which it is formulated, seeking to escape the contextualism, relativism, and ethnocentrism that other types of prescriptions are subject to. Norms without a rational foundation are contingent and, thus, not necessary. A norm applicable to every individual must be grounded in a principle that aligns with its claim to universality. A system of norms can only be supported by a norm that itself serves as the foundation for all others. The categorical imperative is such a norm, serving as the basis for other duties. According to Weber, the rationality found by Kant in the realm of morality (i.e., practical reason) is absent in the sciences that deal with culture and society. The knowledge produced by these sciences possesses a rationality and rational foundation distinct from that of the moral realm.
But Weber not only points this out in the case of morality but also in the realm of law. In The Problem of Irrationality in the Social Sciences, he states:
"In their battle against Enlightenment legal rationalism, Savigny and his school sought to demonstrate the irrational and non-deductible nature of universal legal maxims from law that originate and are valid within a community. By emphasizing the inseparable connections between law itself and all aspects of a people's life, in order to make intelligible the necessarily individual character of all genuinely national law, they hypostatize the necessarily irrational and individual concept of 'Volksgeist' (the spirit of the people) as the source of law, language, and the rest of the cultural heritage of peoples."
This, of course, meant demonstrating the contingency of every legal norm and its lack of universality, which could only be provided by showing that it has a rational foundation. By demonstrating that there is no “core of rationality” protected from all relativism and ethnocentrism—a core of rationality accessible to any subject, regardless of the culture in which they find themselves—one gains legitimacy to deny the possibility of universally and necessarily valid norms. In contrast to Kantian moral optimism and similar positions in the field of law, various schools and currents have emerged. Weber refers to one of them in the cited passage. One of the legal currents that critiques normativism and the idea of universal norms and that has been significant in the 20th century is decisionism, which will be discussed in the section dedicated to Kondylis. For now, it suffices to have noted Weber’s assessment of the problem of irrationality in law, which is part of the social sciences. The particularity of legal norms developed within a nation prevents them from being considered universal norms. They are intrinsically contingent.
Norms and Values in Light of Decisionism
In Macht und Entscheidung (Power and Decision), Kondylis outlines the reasons why, despite the theoretical aspirations that have existed since antiquity—believing, in political philosophy and philosophy of law, that it is possible to achieve a perfect or ideal state, a utopian state (which, as Kondylis notes, is a “no-place” and therefore unrealizable in this world)—political ideals like "perpetual peace" or religious ideals like establishing a "kingdom of justice" in this life are unattainable, despite representing the loftiest aspects of human nature: our ethical behavior.
Kondylis argues that there are compelling reasons to conclude that, despite the hopes of pacifist thinkers and the theoretical and material means employed to achieve a perfect state of coexistence and harmony among humans, such a state can never be maintained for long. The descriptive decisionism does not merely imply a pessimistic anthropology that views humans (in the manner of Hobbes in Leviathan) as beings naturally inclined towards conflict and war. It does not claim that the state of war between humans is perpetual and irrevocably their destiny. Instead, it maintains that although humans may not be in a state of war at any given moment, the possibility of such a state will never entirely disappear.
Kondylis explains this paradox: human beings attempt to free themselves from a part of themselves to make more space for another part. Yet, this part is so intrinsically connected to their being that it cannot be abandoned without also abandoning oneself. Hence, “norms for the human park,” as Sloterdijk terms them, are necessary. The Habermasian ideal (understood as a regulative ideal) of a communicative community—the transcendental presupposition of human communication—where all individuals have a voice, where there are no impediments to clear communication, where violence is never used, and only dialogical means are employed, and where opinions are exchanged rationally to reach agreements on public matters, is an unattainable community.
Even if posed as a regulative ideal, it must be understood in limited terms. If it is recognized that striving towards this perfect state of communication will always result in progress (even if the state itself is never fully achieved), then significant advances can be made.
The norms regulating communal life are, therefore, one of the most essential components of any human society, particularly in those where there is no explicit or implicit consensus on the moral values that should be adopted. In multicultural societies, where differences in origin are often associated with differences in religion, moral values are always a subject of debate. Given that consensus on these values is unattainable—since they are based on irrational decisions from a scientific standpoint, being the result of dogmatic choices, influenced by ideologies or religious beliefs that serve as the foundation of morality—it is necessary to adopt elements that can serve as the foundation for communal life among multicultural citizens.
Political and philosophical theories have attempted to address this issue. One of the most significant is J. Rawls' proposal of "political liberalism," which has influenced American democratic life through the presence of this thinker in courts and other democratic bodies that, based on the constitution, draft and approve new laws. Political liberalism is an example of how ultimate values can be articulated with social and political norms. A society of humans without rules not only constantly faces the danger of dissolution but likely does not constitute a society of humans at all. The principle of public order cannot be violated. The establishment of norms must contribute to maintaining this order. That is their sole purpose.
When people lack norms that regulate everyone—including those responsible for applying and judging them—chaos prevails, preventing individuals from enjoying the benefits that governed societies have. These are the most basic norms imaginable, as they form the foundation for many other laws. Indeed, the fundamental norms that allow for the regular existence of a social order serve as a fundamental basis for the creation of rules affecting only specific areas developed within the given society (e.g., elite sports, public limited companies, the private business sector, etc.). Unlike moral values, norms ensure the existence of social order.
The various contemporary proposals for harmonizing coexistence through moral norms—beyond just political and legal norms—that collectively form a common code affecting all citizens have been developed within a debate that focuses less on the content and application of these norms—i.e., how they will actually impact those they are directed at and how they will be enforced—and more on finding a shared framework from which to grant legitimacy to these norms.
It is not only necessary to reach a consensus at the level of application—having a unified legal code specifying how norms should be applied, with this specification being consensually agreed upon to ensure its legitimacy through majority consent on a particular mode of application—but it is also crucial to have mutual understanding at the level of the source of legitimacy itself for implementing a system by which norms are to be applied. This level acts as the foundation for all others. Differences at this fundamental level do not determine how norms will be applied. Instead, this level focuses on what enables the existence of a legislative system that affects all citizens. It is a debate about what makes the proposal to establish a system that treats all citizens equally before the law legitimate. The differences we refer to are expressed, for example, in the contrast between a democratic government and a tyrannical one.
At this preliminary level of norm legitimacy, we find the political foundation that makes such legitimacy possible or, in the case of tyrannical regimes, eradicates the possibility of debate on that legitimacy. At this foundational level, there is no proper legal rationality. Everything hinges on what Kondylis and other philosophers studying this problem from the same perspective call "decision." Indeed, the legitimacy of establishing a legal order cannot derive from rational consensus because, and this is the major difficulty, there is no shared legal rationality. Consensus can only be achieved if there are previously compatible positions.
The issue at hand is not merely the absence of a shared legal order—without which, as Kant points out, there is no concept of justice or injustice, since there is no consensus on what is just or unjust, nor are there institutions to appeal to in cases of perceived injustice. Rather, the problem is that the framework of rationality necessary to establish a shared legal framework does not exist. This framework can only be established through an act that is external to it. Consequently, once this framework is established, it cannot be used to understand the act that founded it. The act of founding is outside of the framework it creates, making the two incongruous. To understand the act that established the framework, one must step outside of it. The framework of rationality depends on an act that is considered "irrational" from the perspective of that framework. However, the true nature of this foundational act cannot be grasped from within the framework itself, thus it cannot be deemed irrational. The decision that establishes the framework of rationality is not irrational because it is outside of the framework or because it is perceived as irrational from within it; it is irrational because it does not involve consensus. The framework of rationality facilitates consensus on a legal framework: it allows people to agree to transition from a state where there is no legislation and where the only law is that of nature—characterized by force, violence, and death—to a state where a common legal system is established. This political pact, which legitimizes the creation of a shared legal framework, is founded on the fear of death and the desire to avoid violence, as described in Hobbes' theory of the social contract. If an individual violates or fails to adhere to the rules established by this pact, they will be penalized according to the legislation that arises from it.
3.2. Moral Values
In Macht und Entscheidung (Power and Decision), Kondylis addresses, alongside the issue of the rationality of norms, the widely debated question of the subjectivity of values. He questions whether valuations can be considered descriptions and whether it is possible to have descriptions that are free of values or axiologically neutral.
Although Weber and Kondylis engage in different philosophical and sociological debates about values and norms, it is clear that Kondylis has been influenced by the tradition of thought represented by Weber.
"It is only possible to adopt an axiologically neutral viewpoint (a value-free consideration) if one takes seriously the thesis—and its logical implications—that the world and humanity have no intrinsic meaning or value. From the perspective of the necessary cultural link between controlling the instinct of self-preservation and the belief in the meaning of life, it is unlikely that a socially significant adoption of the axiologically neutral standpoint will occur."
For Kondylis, and for the skepticism he defends, both the world and humanity lack intrinsic value and meaning. They are always constructs, conventions, that arise in specific contexts and are attributed to them. Consequently, they are merely temporary attributes of the world and humanity; contingent attributes, and in no way universal. They can be universalizable, but they are always subject to disappearing if the conditions that necessitated their universalization cease to exist, as they do not belong to the nature of the world and humanity. The essence of both, what constitutes them most intimately, is the lack of value and meaning. Under this conception, the world and humanity are akin to what surrealism imagines: practically everything has the character of artifice. Everything can be true, and everything can be false. The distinctions and boundaries between them depend on decision. Decision, as we saw, determines the value and significance of the world and humanity. The origin of values and meaning lies in a specific, finite, and contingent act, which is valid only because it is in effect, and cannot be imposed imperishably. Eventually, the world and humanity will reveal their inherent lack of value and meaning.
For Kondylis, as we can see from the quote, the idea of an axiologically neutral perspective is based on an anthropological continuum: that humans are inherently axiologically neutral; that is, the question of whether we can choose between different values and provide reasons to defend them does not even arise, because the nature of humanity is indifferent to moral values. This means that the objectivity of the world and humanity (and the sciences dealing with them) belongs to them inherently, and values are added to them later and superficially. According to this view, saying that the world and humanity are axiologically neutral is equivalent to saying they are objective.
We have already used the concept of “decision” in the sense of the philosophical tradition within which Kondylis’s position is framed. Decisionism is a philosophical-moral, political, and legal doctrine that asserts that norms originate from specific historical institutional bodies. It holds that it is a mistaken position to claim that norms exist independently of these kinds of institutions. This definition, perhaps overly general, needs to be specified, as there are various types of decisionism. Carl Schmitt is one of the thinkers who has most contributed to the construction and systematization of this philosophical position. However, the decisionism he advocates differs from the one developed by Kondylis, as we will see.
A fundamental difference between normativism and decisionism lies in their conception of the validity and justification of legal norms. Where does the validity of a norm reside: in a conventional and concrete act by a group of individuals or an individual (and thus the norms do not have genuine validity, but only applicability, as they are rationally unjustifiable, meaning there is no rational foundation for them, but only a “personal decision” that determines its choice) or in a common fund of rationality that allows us to verify that the chosen norm is appropriate and guarantees the availability of reasons to defend it?
Perhaps legal norms are, as decisionism believes, the result of an act that is irrational from a normative standpoint. But this may not be the case for other types of norms. Does the validity of a moral imperative not reside in its rationality? Legal normativism is akin to Kantian ethics of duty. Similar positions to decisionism exist within moral philosophy. Decisionism can be more vigorously criticized by those who support an ethics of duty than by legal normativists. However, extrapolating decisionism to the moral sphere and criticizing it from that perspective is inadequate, as this doctrine is understood as a theory exclusively concerned with the foundations of law.
Carl Schmitt notes in the preface to the second edition of Political Theology that the decision — in the philosophical sense we have defined — is the origin of the "validity" (if it can be called that) of a norm. Therefore, it is more important for understanding their origin to consider the institutions that have proposed, promulgated, and officially established them, which has allowed other institutions to apply them with legitimacy and to sanction those who have violated them. The validity of norms, therefore, must be sought in the institutions, and not in the content of the norms themselves. They do not have validity by themselves; validity always depends on the organs, institutions, or individuals that attribute it to them. Hence, it is necessary to deny, against normativism, that there are norms valid in themselves, norms that are inherently more rational than others.
“Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.” The state of exception (Ausnahmezustand) is one in which, due to a force majeure, the existing norms are suspended for a certain period to avoid a catastrophe; for example, if the state is invaded by another. In The Prince by Machiavelli, the situation that Schmitt's term refers to was already hinted at. The Italian thinker pointed out that the main goal of the prince or sovereign is to remain in power, that is, to maintain his sovereignty, and for this purpose, he may declare a state of exception (which he refers to as "raison d'etat"). During the state of exception, the one who establishes the norms and has the power to enforce them is the sovereign.
Weber's conception of norms and moral, political, social, and economic values is supported, as we can see in his essay Technique, Informatics, and Culture, by the expression—so common among German philosophers—"era of science and technique," an era in which the triumphant and hegemonic phenomenon is the triumph of capitalist economy, where moral values are considered essentially subjective, lacking universalizable content and, therefore, not susceptible to scientific treatment. Norms are conceived as their counterpart: due to their conventional nature, they do not possess a nature external to scientific study, a study which requires that the content being studied is something that is or can be present in the life of every subject.
3.3. Rationality and Normativity
In Macht und Entscheidung, Kondylis presents a conception of norms within the framework of descriptive decisionism. The issue of the rationality of norms has been examined in recent decades by various philosophical positions, such as Critical Rationalism, Discourse Ethics, and Pragmatism. It is also a problem that can be framed within traditional philosophical debates, such as those between idealism and empiricism, realism and antirealism, or criticisim and relativism and skepticism. Contemporary versions of Kantian criticism can be found, according to authors like Rorty, in the philosophy of Apel and Habermas, but also in American analytical philosophy, which has continued to address issues such as the mind or the self from the perspective of the epistemological tradition initiated by Descartes, Locke, and Kant.
Current objections to these philosophical traditions have emerged from various fronts. One notable example is hermeneutics, which Rorty himself supports. He argues that the critique of modern epistemology can also be applied to the conception of values and norms based on that theory. For instance, the Kantian idea of a “self” that “accompanies all representations” or a mind that represents the world, remains integral to Kant’s idea of normativity.
In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant formulates the categorical imperative in three distinct ways, the concept of the self is central. Kant’s approach to morality is often described as “monological,” in contrast to the dialogical approach of transcendental philosophy represented by Apel. The aim of finding a rational foundation for moral norms persists in the transcendental dialogical perspective.
Kondylis’s position, however, diverges from this viewpoint. He and Rorty both align with a neopragmatist spirit, suggesting that norms do not contain an inherent core of rationality that makes them universal. Instead, they argue that rational criteria for evaluating moral norms are relative. This means that these criteria and the norms themselves are shaped by the social, political, or legal frameworks in which they are developed. Thus, no norm can possess a universal rational character. Each norm is contingent, as is its rationality. Recognizing that rationality is contingent does not equate to renouncing it. Rationality without claims to universality remains valid. The acknowledgment that the framework of rationality underpinning every norm is confined to its context does not negate the norm’s validity. The cancellation of validity occurs through tools and means—arguments and reasonings that are central to theoretical debate, such as those advocated by skepticism.
The idea of a rationality that transcends the horizons of contingency, which Rorty refers to, is not “erroneous” per se. It challenges the notion that there could be criteria allowing us to classify norms as “correct” or “incorrect” from a detached, “universal” standpoint. This standpoint would be based on a core of rationality that serves to evaluate every norm and determine whether it could be considered a maxim that could “become a universal law.”
For Kondylis, every moral norm and value is part of a worldview (Weltbilder). However, this does not preclude the possibility of an objective description of them. In the interview titled “The Skeptical Quest for Truth Against Normative Decisionism,” Marin Trepsta asks Kondylis a thought-provoking question implicitly referring to Macht und Entscheidung. The question is: Does descriptive decisionism merely consist of a theory developed under the assumption of nihilism, understood as the denial of the objectivity of norms and values? Kondylis responds:
"The question is answered with a simple "yes." However, nihilism cannot constitute a call for destruction, for if it were, it would also have to establish itself as a new norm—one that mandates destruction—which would be simply illogical. Historically, significant destructions were carried out in the name of norms and values, regardless of the particular enemy labeled as "nihilistic."
The question I find truly compelling is: Why continue thinking from the reassuring certainties that uphold normativism, instead of venturing occasionally into dangerous areas?"
Kondylis, with descriptive decisionism, contrasts sharply with normativism. The latter views law or morality as systems of norms. Normative legal theory is linked with normative moral theory, such as its Kantian version. According to Kondylis, nihilism connects with decisionism precisely due to its perspective on values. Nihilism denies the objectivity of values and norms, yet it cannot serve as a "call for destruction" itself. If it did, it would become a position endorsing the validity of such a "call," effectively transforming it into a mandate (or a norm).
Gabriel Negretto notes:
"Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism can be summarized in a single concept: decisionism. In his view, decisionism stands in opposition to normativism and a conception of politics based on the ideal of rational discussion. As a legal doctrine, decisionism asserts that, in critical circumstances, the realization of law depends on a political decision devoid of normative content.
From an ethical-political perspective, the essence of decisionism does not imply the absence of values and norms in political life but rather the conviction that these cannot be chosen through a process of rational deliberation among alternative worldviews. Values and norms must be interpreted and decided by those who hold power.
Philosophically, Schmitt’s decisionism is a reaction against the critical principles inherited from the Enlightenment. Schmitt, like Max Weber, shared the disillusioning conclusion that the process of rationalization in the Western world culminated in a mechanized and predictable civilization, in which humanity finds itself trapped like in an “iron cage."
Kondylis considers decisionism a theory about the origin and development of worldviews. Descriptive decisionism asserts that an objective description of values and norms within a worldview is possible. The affiliation with a framework of understanding does not transfer the particular and contingent nature of values to a description with claims of universality and objectivity.
Although descriptions are always made from within a worldview—and thus no worldview is described in a conceptual and content-free vacuum, but against the backdrop of a worldview (which may or may not coincide with the one being described)—the description reveals recognizable features of and from any comprehensive and worldview framework.
The clarification of the universal traits of a worldview—what every perspective possesses, such as the formal conditions of possibility of the worldview—is guided by a certain epistemic Kantianism applied to the fields of politics and morality. Contemporary authors who advocate proceduralism (including J. Habermas) have transferred the Kantian model of validating scientific knowledge and investigating the formal conditions of all knowledge to the realm of values and norms.
In a way, descriptive decisionism aligns with the proceduralist claim to find a common core of rationality from which to verify or critique every norm and moral value, regardless of the culture or society in which they prevail or are in force. However, the claim to critique such values from a “supra-framework of rationality” (using Rorty’s term to designate a framework that aims to encompass all existing and possible frameworks) and to describe them objectively is distinct in both positions. That is, the proceduralist idea of a rational critique of every value and norm (following the Kantian tradition) should not be conflated with the decisionist-descriptive idea of objectively describing any value.
Nevertheless, both share the idea of positioning oneself from which all frameworks of understanding can be judged, the notion that there exists a supra-framework of rationality and understanding from which to view and describe values belonging to particular frameworks of understanding. In this sense, Rorty's relativist critique could apply to both descriptive decisionism (even though it sees relativism not as an enemy but as a companion) and Habermas’s proceduralism.
For descriptive decisionism, adherence to certain moral values does not prevent one from presenting the nature of these values. Scientific investigation into values is feasible because it can disregard or abstract from axiological assumptions. However, this does not mean that it always must be this way.
Descriptive decisionism, as characterized by Kondylis in Macht und Entscheidung, is a theory that aims to transcend such assumptions. At the same time, descriptive decisionism views every worldview and its normative claim as the result of attempts to present personal visions and perceptions as universal. This can also and especially apply to ideologies, which contain, if anything, an even more subjective element than worldviews. The challenge of questioning the values defended by ideologies can have significant consequences, unlike with worldviews.
3.4. Skepticism and Values
The science of the "life-world" that originates from Husserl's work is a philosophical science aimed at uncovering how the intentional consciousness encounters this object, that is, how the life-world presents itself to consciousness as a phenomenon. This philosophical science begins to acquire moral significance in other thinkers who have extended phenomenology into the realm of moral philosophy. The analysis of the life-world from a phenomenological-moral perspective has been undertaken by contemporary thinkers who assume that the moral world possesses autonomy, that moral values are objective, and that moral norms (the imperatives or maxims proposed to rationally regulate human action) have universal validity because, despite variations in their content depending on the context in which they are proposed, the rational form of duty remains constant and necessary in any genuine moral obligation—meaning, any obligation not founded on an "act of power."
Kondylis, in contrast, argues that moral norms are primarily the result of "decisions." This means that not only do they necessarily have a historical and social character, and therefore be contingent and not necessary (and likewise, their validity is contingent and not necessary), but also that their obligatory nature is established at a specific moment by a concrete subject; before the "decision," there is no obligation to adhere to a norm. There are no intrinsically obligatory norms.
Regarding moral values, Kondylis presents a distinct perspective. He supports a form of moral relativism that is not equivalent to moral skepticism. Kondylis believes that objective knowledge of values and the worldviews on which they are based is possible, despite his assertion that objective values do not exist. Thus, he aligns with nihilism, but with the precision we have outlined earlier.
Moreover, although he denies the intrinsic objectivity of values and considers that objectivity belongs to their descriptions, he acknowledges that these descriptions are part of worldviews and anthropological conceptions from which they cannot be detached and that shape the conditions under which values are described. Consequently, he rejects epistemic skepticism, even as he maintains a relativistic and nihilistic view in the realm of values. His relationship with skepticism is somewhat different from that of other authors who have attempted to refute this philosophical position.
For Kondylis, an axiologically neutral and logically consistent description is indeed possible. However, this does not mean, contrary to what positivist positions have emphasized, that such a description is free from certain assumptions and preconceptions about the objects it describes. Descriptive decisionism does not deny that the type of descriptions in question "is based on a certain perception of human affairs." In contrast to this view, positivism and critical rationalism have argued that some ideals of science are free from cultural, moral, or religious preconceptions, and that, consequently, there is no necessary interrelation between the ideal of a "worldview theory without presuppositions" and specific cultural, anthropological, or moral assumptions.
As we can see, Kondylis holds a position similar to Weber's regarding values: scientific descriptions are possible, even though they may not be predominant, and despite the fact that value prejudices can condition or determine scientific research, and that facts themselves are always understood within the worldview framework in which such values are embedded, an objective description of facts is still feasible.
Kondylis clearly distinguishes between moral skepticism and epistemic skepticism. Descriptive decisionism relies on this distinction and supports only epistemic skepticism. He argues that “the declaration of the relativity of norms and values does not constitute a form of moral skepticism. In my view, this declaration is based on solid and demonstrable empirical knowledge.” This means that one cannot use skeptical and relativistic arguments against skepticism and relativism themselves. It is possible to demonstrate that one must be skeptical of norms: that they lack universal character and are merely conventional. In contrast to normativism, Kondylis's decisionism supports moral skepticism while rejecting epistemic skepticism. It is possible to demonstrate (and thus construct knowledge with a solid foundation) that what is studied in morality and ethics (norms, values, ideals, worldviews, etc.) are nothing more than ethnocentric, relative, historical, conventional objects, never universally valid.
And this demonstration does not self-cancel. As we have indicated, arguments that the skeptic relies on cannot be used against him. In moral skepticism, one cannot operate as in epistemic skepticism: one cannot use Wittgenstein's approach from On Certainty to refute the skeptic, where he argues that doubt only arises against a backdrop of beliefs, which acts as the root and support. This backdrop is not only something that doubt presupposes and builds upon—doubt always operates from something (it never acts upon a void: doubt always has an “intentional” character, in the sense of Husserl)—but it also acts as a condition of possibility for doubt itself. Without prior beliefs, there can be no doubt. These epistemological beliefs are the ultimate substrate upon which doubt operates. However, the “something” upon which doubt operates includes not only these beliefs but also their relationship with doubt itself: the relationship between belief and doubt is also part of what is doubted, in the case of Cartesian radical doubt.
Without questioning the link between beliefs and doubt, doubt itself cannot properly occur. In other words, doubt cannot take place (in the Cartesian sense of radical doubt: the metaphor of the evil demon). This is why Wittgenstein, in defending this thesis, opposes Descartes and the idea that doubt calls absolutely everything into question, including the beliefs upon which doubt rests. In other words, Wittgenstein challenges the notion that it is possible to doubt absolutely everything. One can doubt everything, except the fact that there are beliefs supporting doubt and those very beliefs themselves.
Conclusion
In Weber's conception of the relationship between values and social science, there are two important pathways that we have explored throughout this work.
On one hand, social science is capable of conducting axiologically neutral or objective investigations and descriptions of facts. It can formulate hypotheses about social phenomena. If these hypotheses are proven valid — that is, if they accurately reflect the truth of the facts — they become social theories. Therefore, by objectively describing facts after relevant investigations and deriving results that are subsequently demonstrated to be correct, social theories contribute new knowledge. As a result, they are genuinely scientific theories.
Values can be bracketed in social research. Scientists must not impose or allow their values to influence or determine the direction of their research and the manner in which they describe facts; otherwise, these would no longer be facts but unjustified interpretations. Although every theory is an interpretation, some interpretations are closer to the objectivity required for contributing new knowledge, while others, due to the value prejudices of the scientists, diverge from the ideal of objectivity.
This is the most well-known aspect of Weber's conception of values, which maintains a close connection with his distinction between the subjectivity of values and the objectivity of science. Values belong to the private sphere and can even be irrational if we use scientific knowledge, which describes the world objectively, as our model of rationality. The choice of values is a subjective, private matter; there are no rational criteria for choosing one set of values over another (and the corresponding worldviews they frame). In terms of scientific rationality, values are irrational or, at the very least, lack the superior form of rationality that scientific descriptions possess. Therefore, there are two completely distinct spheres: 1) objective descriptions of facts and 2) judgments guided by values (i.e., value judgments or valuations).
On the other hand, there can be a science of values, but scientists working in this field must also set aside their own values to investigate them properly. Although, as Gadamer has shown, preconceptions and biases are a necessary condition in the humanities, this is not the case in the social sciences, where the object of study is facts about the world, not texts to interpret. While social theories are also interpretations, they are not in the same sense as, for example, the study of a historical period based on available documents about that period.
Consequently, following the division established by Rovira in the cited article, the dimension of the problem of values in Weber's work that most interests us is the relationship between objective descriptions and value judgments. At the same time, this problem is incomprehensible in Weber's work without the proposal of a clear distinction between the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of value judgments. These judgments are subjective in that they are made based on values whose content is also subjective. Since there is no rational way to choose one value over another—rather, it is a matter of personal preference, though this choice cannot be preceded by a rational demonstration but rather by reasoning about what goals can be achieved by choosing that value and what goals cannot—value judgments made from a particular moral standpoint (that is, based on values) cannot aspire to achieve the objectivity of scientific descriptions, which have no relation to values.
In Kondylis's case, the central problem in Weber of whether it is possible to achieve a "logically consistent" and "axiologically neutral" description is also pertinent. According to descriptive decisionism, it is indeed possible to make objective judgments about facts in the fields of cultural sciences, social sciences, and human sciences. However, this does not mean that such descriptions are free from certain preconceptions that condition the meaning of the judgments.
In one respect, both Weber's and Kondylis's views on values and evaluations converge in their assertion that it is possible to adopt a scientific and philosophical perspective in which all value judgments are eliminated. Kondylis’s descriptive decisionism aims to describe human affairs without making any value judgments, even though it acknowledges the preconceptions that underlie all descriptions. Similarly, Weber believed that objective descriptions are possible in social science and that the social scientist must refrain from making any kind of evaluation. Only by maintaining this separation can objective descriptions of reality be achieved.
The most important issues examined throughout the work, from the perspectives of Weber and Kondylis, regarding the relationship between social science and values have been:
Whether values should or can be restricted in the description of facts.
Whether the science of values—axiology—has an empirical or descriptive character, and whether values should be absent from the descriptions it produces.
Whether there is a rational foundation for moral normativity. Just as values need justification to be considered universal, moral norms also require a rational foundation. In the Kantian tradition—renewed by some of the schools of thought influencing Weber—this has been understood in terms of discovering their rational basis.
See J. Rodríguez Martínez, Introducción a M. Weber, La “superación” de la concepción materialista de la historia. Crítica a Stammler, trans. de J. Martínez Rodríguez, Gedisa, Barcelona, 2014.
See M. Weber, La “superación” de la concepción materialista de la historia, p. 112.
J. Rovira Mas, ‘Ciencia social y valores en Max Weber’, en Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 103-104 (2004, I-II), p. 128.
Anthony Giddens, Política y sociología en Max Weber, trad. de A. Linares, Alianza, Madrid, 1998, p. 12.
Max Weber, ‘La ciencia como vocación’, en El político y el científico, trad. de F. Rubio Lorente, Alianza, Madrid, 1995.
Max Weber, Sobre la teoría de las ciencias sociales, trad. de M. Faber-Kaiser, Península, Barcelona, 1971, pp. 5 y ss
For a classic study of the problem of theoretical assumptions and scientific dogmas, see T. S. Kuhn, The Dogma in Scientific Research, translated by D. Eslava, Cuadernos Teorema, Valencia, 198
Although the issue of the impossibility of absolute objectivity in scientific knowledge is not a recurring theme in Weber's work, it is the subject of reflection in some of his essays, which we will address.
F. Nietzsche, Genealogía de la moral, trans. de A. Sánchez Pascual, Alianza, Madrid, 2002, p. 155.
G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, translated by A. L. Bixio, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1987.
In this work, the Italian thinker, a representative of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics that begins with Truth and Method, acknowledges his debt to both Nietzsche and Heidegger. Both authors hold distinct conceptions of nihilism. Although Vattimo incorporates both conceptions of nihilism into his own thought — which served as the basis for the development of the "weak thought" attributed to the Italian philosopher —, as noted in his recent essays, despite his distancing from religious thought during a certain period of his work, he has ultimately reconsidered Christianity as a source of his reflections.
Some critics have pointed out a paradox in his thinking: he continues to admit nihilism even while regarding Christianity as highly relevant. For an exploration of the relationship that Vattimo sees between nihilism and Christianity, see G. Vattimo, Believing that One Believes, translated by C. Revilla, Paidós, Barcelona, 1996.
F. Nietzsche, La gaya ciencia, trans. de A. Sánchez Pascual, Alianza, Madrid, 2008, § 125.